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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STAT2 OF UTAH 
S..:\:\IUEL 1-\Di\:\IS and HILDA 
~I. AD.L\~IS, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents., 
vs. 
DOX .t\. T.L\YLOR and ~IILDll.ED 
B. T.L\ YLOR, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Case Xo. 
9986 
ST.c\TE:\IENT OF THE NATURE OF 
THE CASE 
This is an unlawful detainer action by 'vhich re-
spondents seek restitution of premises and treble dam-
ages against appellants and in 'vhich appellant counter-
claim for specific performance of a verbal lease and 
option to purchase. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court gave judgment "no cause of 
action" on Plaintiffs' complaint for restitution and 
damages, and on appellants' counter-claim declared 
that the appellants were properly in possession of the 
property under a lease, but denied appellants judg-
ment on option to purchase. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondents seek reversal of the lower court's 
award of possession to the appellants and on their 
cross-appeal ask for restitution of the premises to the 
respondents and award of treble damages for failure 
to vacate. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts as presented in appellants 
brief are substantially true except as to the changes 
which are set forth herein pointing out and emphasizing 
appellants' statements inconsistent with the facts. Re-
spondents point out some facts for emphasis and assert 
other facts as cor1trolling factors in the case. 
The appellants contended that they originally 
agreed on a ten-year lease. Respondents claim lease 
was to have been from three to five years ( T. 24, L. 4). 
The Taylors never at any time gave an option to 
buy, but rather stated that Taylors would have the first 
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chance lo buy if the tin1e ever carne that they decided 
to sell ( 'r. 2~j, ~ti). 
'!'here \Vas a dispute among the parties present as 
to ho\v tnuch of the land should have been surveyed. 
~lr. Taylor stated it \vas to go back to the post ( T. 1 ~). 
~Ir. Fifield, the surveyor, stated that he didn't go to 
the post, and that it could ha,~e been 'vithin 10, 20, or 
50 feet; but he never 'vent to the post ('f. 110). :\Irs. 
Adams testified that the surveyor 'vent farther than she 
told hin1 to go ( T. 30) , that a copy of the pia t was not 
g·iven to ~Irs . .1\.dams until some months later ( 'r. 42). 
,-fhe lease "·as given back to appellants' attorney a 
day or two after received, and respondents were never 
presented with another lease ( T. 29), and the respond-
ents never had another lease prepared "·ith the four-or-
five-year provision in it, although l\Ir. Taylor stated 
they \Vere going to do so after they signed Exhibit .r\. 
(T. 19). 
It is stipulated between the counsel that the officer 
serv-ing the notice "~ould have testified that he served 
l\Irs. Taylor personally, by giving her a copy of the 
notice to Quit and ,.,.. acate at the place of business, and 
that Chief ~Iottisha"· 'vould have testified that he pre-
pared the notice for 1nailing and personally placed the 
notice in an env-elope and delivered it to his secretary 
for mailing by certified mail, and that she, the secre-
tary, 'vould hav-e testified that she addressed it and 
had taken the letter, addressed to )lr. Taylor at his 
residence in Clearfield, L~ tab, and mailed it, certified 
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mail, in the Layton, Utah, post office on the twelfth 
day of January, 1962. 
That there were a number of improvements on the 
premises, and that plaintiffs' Exhibit ''C" reflects the 
condition of the drive-in after remodeling, and plain-
tiffs' Exhibits "E" and ''}.,, show the condition prior 
to their remodeling. 
That in the findings of the trial court, the improve-
ments were in excess of $6,000.00, and the testimony 
of Mr. Ford was that the whole building could have 
been built for about $4,500.00 (T. 122). 
It should be pointed out that the property in ques-
tion was owned solely by Samuel J. Adams, and such 
fact "\vas known to the appellants as Mr. Taylor stated 
that Mrs. Adams told them Mr. Adams was the owner 
(T. 86}. 
That Samuel Adams never signed any note or 
memorandum giving the Taylors an option to buy or 
lease; and while Hilda Adams, wife of Samuel Adams, 
did most of the negotiating, there was never any con-
tention at any time that she had any authority in writ-
ing to sign for Mr. Adams, either on a lease or an option. 
That all evidence clearly points to the fact that the 
negotiations were preliminary to drawing the final 
lease, and no final lease was ever drawn. 
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.~.\RGU~IEXrl, 
POIXT I 
'filE r1,ltiAL C~OUlt'l, ERRED I~ :f.,IXD-
IN(~ TII.~.\'f TIIERE ''r.£\S .~.\~ EXFORCE-
.t\llLE LE.~.\SE. 
1\ lease to be enforceable for a period longer than 
one year under the Utah Code must be in \vriting. 
'l.,itle 25, l~hapter 5, Section 3, of the 1953 Utah Code 
provides: 
"Every contract for the leasing for a longer 
period than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, 
or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the 
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, 
is in writing subscribed by the party by 'vhom the 
lease or sale is to be made, or by his la ,vful agent 
thereunto authorized in writing.'' 
In this case, because of the fact that )lr. Adams 
\vas hard of hearing due to advanced age ( 78 years, 
T. -:t6), l\Irs. Adams did most of the talking; but Mr. 
Taylor knew that nlr. Adams \Vas the sole owner of 
the property, and that he was the person who would 
have to sign the lease, as Taylor testified that :\Irs. 
Adams had so told them ( T. 86) . 
There is no question concerning the fact that no 
lease \vas ever signed by San1uel J. Adams, and no 
note or memorandum was ever subscribed by him. In 
fact, the uncontroverted testimony of )Ir. Adams was 
that Taylor should do nothing on it until he got a con-
tract ( T. -:t7), and "'that he, Taylor, signed the contract 
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before he done any business there, or it was up to him." 
(T. 49, L. 6-16). It is also clear that Mr. Adams had 
not given Mrs. Adams authority to sign for him, as he 
said she had the authority to negotiate, but not to sign 
(T. 49). 
There can be no question of the fact that there 
wasn't compliance with the statute. In fact, it is very 
clear that there was no intention on the part of anyone to 
be bound without a written lease. The Taylors assumed 
the responsibility of getting and supplying it. When 
the Taylors proceeded to go ahead, they were taking 
a calculated risk, as they were going ahead contrary 
to the agreement; and they should not now be able to 
complain, as all the Taylors would have had to do at 
any point of the negotiations would have been to refuse 
to proceed farther until the lease was agreed upon and 
signed. 
It is a fundamental rule in law that any person 
going into possession of property with the permission 
of the owner, without having purchased the property, 
is there as a tenant. In this case, the Taylors went in 
contrary to the agreement, but did go in with permis-
sion, as shown by the fact that the rent was accepted. 
Williston states that in such cases there is a creation 
of the relationship of landlord and tenant. 
It is also rather fundamental that where the lease 
fails to create another form of tenancy, if the payments 
are on a monthly basis, the tenant becomes a month-to-
month tenant. 
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Alneriean .Juris prudence \rolume 32. Landlord 
and 'renant, Section 71, Page 86, states: 
'"Accordingly, a tenancy from year to year or 
from month to month arises 'vhere no definite 
tin1e is agreed upon, and the rent is fixed at so 
much per year or month." 
In this ease it is the contention of the respondents 
that the tenancy became a month-to-month tenancy 
when there was no agreeable lease executed. 
'fhe appellants argue that the negotiations and the 
tenancy \vas under a verbal lease, and set forth that the 
Statute will enforce a verbal lease under the theory of 
part performance. However, to have a verbal lease, all 
of the elements and details of a lease must be present. 
At Am. J ur. 32, Landlord and Tenant, Section 
62, Page 77, among other things, provides: 
"It is a cardinal principle in the creation of 
term for years that the term must be certain, 
that is, there must be certainty as to the coin-
mencement and duration of the term. * * * albeit 
there appear no certainty of years in the lease, 
yet if, by reference to a certainty, it may be made 
certain, it sufficeth. But the reference should 
be to a thing that has express certainty at the 
time the lease is made, and not to a possible or 
casual certainty.'' 
In the case of Birdzell vs. Utah Oil Refining Com-
pany, 242 P. 2nd, Page 578, decided April I, 1952, 
"·here there "·as an alleged oral agreement bet\veen the 
parties for a lease and a letter setting forth some of the 
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conditions, the court sets forth the three essentials in 
a contract to make it valid under the STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS both as to lease and sell. These are: 
FIRST, definite agreement as to the extent 
and boundary of the property to be leased. 
SECOND, a definite and agreed term. 
THIRD, a definite and agreed rental, and the 
time and manner of its payment." 
In the present case the appellants, as support and 
for the terms of the lease, have cited a memorandum 
which is marked Plaintiffs' Exhibit A and is set forth 
in their statement of facts. They do not claim that this 
memorandum is sufficient to constitute a lease, and have 
to go outside of the memorandum for some of the other 
terms; but they do claim that this, with the other things, 
makes up a verbal lease. 
In the Birdzell case the Plaintiffs attempted to 
claim a lease setting forth the conditions of the proposed 
lease as shown in a letter a memorandum sufficient 
to take it out of the Statute of Frauds and in that case 
the court held : 
"The above letter will not suffice as an adequate 
memorandum because it lacks an acknowledg-
ment that a contract has been entered into by 
the parties." 
Applying this test to the present case, it is clear 
that there was no acknowledgment on the memorandum 
that a contract or a lease had been entered into; and the 
memorandum was admittedly not signed by Mr. Adams, 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the o\vner, as he told then1 he \vould not sign it ('r. 48, 
L. 6}. 
'l,he only fact \vhich ~lr. 1\datns, as the O\vner of 
the property. \Vould be chargeable with \Vas the fact 
that he pern1itted the 'f'aylors to go in on the basis of 
$50.00 per month and accepted payment. 
It is admitted that the lease, as prepared by the 
'raylors, \\·as unsatisfactory; and as the proposed lease 
\vas not produced in court, we can assume that all of 
the ter1ns were unsatisfactory, as it ,,·as not signed and 
there \\·as no sho,ving as to just \V hich of the terms \vere 
acceptable, except that a ten-year lease was not accept-
able, and it \\·as admitted that there \vere other changes 
to be made. 
Inasmuch as the testimony is to the effect that ~Ir. 
Bean, the appellants' attorney, was given the lease by 
~Irs. Adan1s about two days after it "·as received ( 1,. 
27. L. 25), and ~Ir. Bean admitted that he probably 
had a copy of the lease in his office ( T. 9, L. 29), the 
lease and negotiations up to that time should be con-
sidered as having been totally unsatisfactory, and 
therefore, only consider the matters surrounding the 
renegotiation agreement as sho,vn by the memorandum. 
Inasmuch as the memorandum is ambiguous and un-
certain in and of itself, and there is no sho,ving that 
any specific terms "Tith respect to the lease \vere agreed 
upon at that time, it would seem that the lease should 
wholly fail. 
11 
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In the case of Utah Loan & Trust Company vs. 
Garbutt~ 6 Utah 342, 23 P. 758, the court states as 
follows: 
"Under this section, where one executor with-
out authority from his coexecutors, who were not 
under a disability and not absent from the state, 
made a lease in writing for more than one year, 
the lease was invalid." 
Under previous heading we also discussed the 
requirements that are set forth in the cases showing 
the necessity of completeness within and of an oral 
agreement and the memorandum showing that it has to 
be complete in and of itself and also show the require-
ments 'for a written lease. Namely, the certainty as to 
all of the elements. 
Under Adams vs. Manning~ 46 Utah 82, 148 P. 
465, the court denied specific performance as follows: 
"A receipt or memorandum is wholly insuffi-
cient to take an alleged parol contract for sale 
of land out of statute of frauds, where it merely 
recites receipt of $30.00 a part payment for the 
land, but contains no sufficient or any descrip-
tion of land alleged to have been sold." 
In the case at bar there is also no description and 
no way of ascertaining what the description would be 
and as stated from the testimony and facts surrounding 
the case, it still is uncertain as to just exactly what 
they wanted to have under the terms of the lease. It 
is admitted that a survey was made but this was subject 
to dispute as set forth in the statement of facts and 
12 
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even then t.he plat \vas not delivered to ~Irs . .i\dan1s 
until tnuch later, after the Exhibit "..£\" \vas signed 
and there is no reference in the memorandun1 to the 
plat or the description of the land and no reference 
was llltule at the tin1e of negotiation. X either ~Irs. 
'l.,aylor or l\lr. 1\.dams discussed the size of the prop-
erty and ~lr. Adan1s had property on t'vo sides of the 
pieee so it could have been of varying sizes. 
Appellants' counsel recognizes the fact that there 
Is one uncertainty, namely, as to \vhether the lease 
should he four or five years and bases his ,,. hole argu-
ment upon the contention that this uncertainty is to be 
resolved in favor of the lessee haYing the alternative 
right to determine whether the lease should be four 
or fiye years. To support his contention he has cited t\vo 
old English cases running back to the 18th and 19th 
centuries to support his position. 
EYen these cases can be distinguished froxn the 
present case, as in the 1nain case there "·as a specific 
n1emorandum setting forth all of the terms of the lease 
sho\\"ing the location, the amount, 'vhen it \vas to com-
mence, 'vhat it was to contain, who \vas to pay taxes 
and a number of other items and in addition, it "·as 
signed by· both parties, the lessee saying he agreed to 
the terms set forth therein. The only question in that 
case, \vhich 'vas undetermined "·ith exactness by the 
lease~ ,,·as "·hether the term "·as to be seven, fourteen, 
or t\venty-one years. 
In the present case \Ve have no such agreement. 
13 
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We have a written memorandum and oral statement, 
both of which it was agreed by the parties would not 
constitute the lease until such time as it was drawn up 
in detail and executed and signed by the parties. 
The appellants claim the doctrine of part perform-
ance takes the contract and lease out of the Statute 
of Frauds and for the part performance, sets forth 
the improvements made on the premises, but even with 
partial performance there has to be an enforceable 
contract. 
In the case of Campbell et al v. Nelson et al.~ 125 
P. 2nd, Page 413, decided May 1, 1942, there was an 
oral contract for the purchase of land and the contract 
was prepared but never signed by the Defendant, who 
went into possession of the property and made con-
siderable improvements and when the owner tried to 
dispossess him, he claimed the improvements as partial 
performance. The court held that: 
"The terms of the contract in the present case 
were indefinite. An oral contract for the purchase 
of real property must be sufficiently definite 
and certain so that it can be enforced by the court. 
Until the parties have agreed as to the terms 
there is not an enforceable contract in fact, and 
partial performance cannot make up for the de-
ficiency in the understanding between the par-
ties." 
Appellants also cite ,r olume 49, Am. J ur. Statute 
of Frauds~ Section 422, Page 727, which among other 
things states : 
14 
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"'fhat the Defendant n1ay be estopped in vie"· 
of the part perforn1ance to assert the S'l'A'r-
U1.,E as a defense.'' 
Quoting from 19 Am. Jur., Section 42, Page 642: 
~'The essential elements of an equitable estop-
pel as related to the party estopped are: ( 1) 
Conduct 'vhich amounts to a false representation 
or concealment of material facts, or, at least, 
'vhich is calculated to convey the impression that 
the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent 
with, those '\vhich the party subsequently at-
tempts to assert; ( 2) Intention, or at least ex .. 
pectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon 
by the other party; ( 3) Knowledge, actual or 
constructive, of the real facts. As related to the 
party claiming the estoppel, they are: (I) Lack 
of knowledge and of the means of knowledge 
of the truth as to the facts in question; ( 2) 
Reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped; 
and ( 3) Action based thereon of such a character 
as to change his position prejudicially." 
It should be noted that there is required to be error 
on one side and fault or fraud on the other. In this case, 
there is no question of fraud or fault on the part of the 
Plaintiffs herein and Defendants do not even contend 
such to be the case. It is clear that none of the elements 
were present which would cause the Doctrine of Es-
toppel to arise and this should be disregarded as it 
cannot affect or apply in the particular case at hand. 
This is further explained in Sections 45, 46, 47, 48, 
and 49. 
Counsel cites Latses L,. r•/ ick Floor., Inc . ., 99 Utah 
15 
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214, 104 P. 2nd 619, to support his theory of part per-
formance. However, the Nick Floor case can be dis-
tinguished from the present case. In that case an agent 
for the landlord executed a lease complete and regular 
on its face, and the tenant went into possession of the 
property and made improvements under the lease. It 
was determined that the age11t did not have the written 
authority and under the Statute_, the lease was void. 
However, as improvements were made on the premises 
by the tenant in good faith in error, thinking he had 
a valid lease, the court ruled that the part performance 
took the case out of the Statute. 
In contrast to the Floor case, the appellants knew 
that there was no authority on the part of Mrs. Adams, 
and also knew when they went ahead with the improve-
ments that there had to be a written lease. Also, there 
was no fraud upon the part of the Adams. 
In the case of Hoggan v. Swayze_, 65 Utah 380, 
237 P. 1097, this can also be distinguished, as in that 
case a person by written agreement bought an un-
divided half interest in certain land and subsequently 
by verbal agreement it was agreed that the property 
would be divided and each party would take half. The 
plaintiff made valuable improvements on the one-half 
based on the oral agreement. In that case there was 
strict reliance on the oral agreement to modify the 
written contract, and there was no ambiguity or ques-
tion as to the terms of the contract and the court granted 
specific performance. 
16 
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In this case the Taylors \vcre specifically told that 
they had to have a \vritten contract and, therefore, 
could not rely on any oral state1nents. 
Also, in the case of In Re Madsen's Estate, I~a 
C tah 327 and 259 P. 2nd 595, the court allowed specific 
perfornutnce as against the 'vif e of the deceased o\vner 
'vhcre there "\\·as a contract of sale executed by the 
owner of the land in \\-riting, and signed by his 'vife 
previous to 'vhich time the owner of the land, 'vho \vas 
also the President of the Madsonia Realty Company, 
had sold the particular property to the ~ladsonia Realty 
Company and had taken from the company the n1oney 
for hin1self as payment for the property. At the tin1e 
he entered into the contract with his wife and the 'l,hird 
Party, he had even sho,vn on the books of the Realty 
Company the profit between 'vhat he had sold it to the 
realty company for and the price that it had been 
resold to the Third Party, as a profit for the realty 
company. However, he had failed to execute a deed 
to the company, and this was the specific performance 
granted by the court. This, of course, would be a perfect 
case for estoppel, as it would have been fraud upon 
the realty company to do otherwise. 
In the case of Randall t\ Tracy Collins Trust Corn-
pany, 6 Utah 2nd 18, 305 P. 2nd 480, specific per-
formance "yas granted against a 'voman's estate. In 
that case the aunt of the Plaintiff 'vas owner of a home 
in Provo and o'vner of controlling stock in a savings 
and loan company, and she promised the Plaintiff that 
17 
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if he would come and take care of her and manage the 
saYings and loan company, that she would leave him 
the stock to the savings and loan company and give 
him her home. She gave him the stock to the savings 
and loan company, but by will left her home to a one-
half cousin. The Plaintiff had fully performed all of 
his duties; and as far as he was concerned, it was a 
completed contract. The court granted specific per-
forn1ance against the estate. It is obvious that it would 
have been much more inequitable for the half cousin 
to take the home when he had done nothing particularly 
for the woman, while the Plaintiff had earned the 
delivery. 
In that case it was never intended that there should 
have been a written agreement and nothing more could 
have been done by the Plaitniff until his aunt died and 
he found out how the will had been made, and then it 
was too late to make a change. 
In the specific case, it was always intended that 
this be a written agreement, and the appellants admit 
that they never had any written agreement drawn up 
pursuant to the terms of the memorandum, atlhough 
they intended to. 
In no case has appellants' counsel been able to 
cite or respondents' counsel able to find '"'here this 
court has ever granted specific performance of a con-
tract which was intended to be in writing, but was never 
reduced to writing,and where the person who was to 
reduce it to writing has failed so to do. 
18 
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POIN'l, II 
'filE 'fRI.t\1~ COUR'r J>R011 ERL \'" DEX ~~~D 
SPECIF~ll, J>ER~'OR~I'""\~CE 01~, ~\X OP'f lOX 
'rO PURCHASE. 
A. SI>ECIJ.,IC l:>ER~_,OR~I.£\XCE l'OlJI.jl) 
N 0 'f H..c\ \~E BEEN GRAN'l,ED E\TEN II~, 
TI-IElLE HAD BEEN A \TALID OP'l,ION, AS 
'l,HERE HAS BEEN NO EXERCISE OR TEN-
DER OF PERF,ORMANCE BY .t\PPEI_JL-L\X'fS. 
It is fundatnental that before an option can be 
specifically enforced, it must ripen into a contract, and 
the option must be exercised by the optionee in accord-
ance with the tern1s and provisions of said option. This 
is true, as an option is a unilateral contract. 
Am. Jur.~ Vol. 49, Specific Performance, Sec. 117, 
P. 137, provides: 
"The remedy of specific perfor1nance can be 
invoked only upon the theory that the optionee 
has accepted the offer and the agreement ha5 
ceased to be an option and has ripened into a 
mutually binding enforceable contract. It is \vell 
established that ,, .. hen an option 'vhich the o""ner 
of property gives to another for the purchase of 
such property is consummated by acceptance 
according to its terms 'vithin the time specified, 
it merges into a contract for the purchase of 
the property which equity "~ill enforce by specific 
performance the same as any other contract 
wherein the requisite elements of equity juris-
diction are present." 
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In the present case they are asking for specific 
performance of the option contract without ever having 
offered the cash to buy to make this option into a bind-
ing agreement on which there are the mutual obliga-
tions required for specific performance. 
Williston on Contracts~ 'r ol. 1, Section 62, Page 
206, states: 
"Action is required by optionee to exercise 
option. This is accomplished by his acceptance 
of the terms. When optionee decides. to exercise 
his option, he must act unconditionally and pre-
cisely according to the terms of the option. 'Vhen 
the acceptance is made the optionor becomes 
bound. Nothing less will suffice. The optionee is 
in ·position of either accepting or not." 
In some cases the law provides, where requested 
in the complaint or counter-claim that specific perform· 
ance be enforced for the option on the theory that the 
party asserting the claim or counterclaim has exercised 
his option and made it ripen into a binding agreement. 
Here, there has never been any pretense that an offer 
has been made and, therefore, there could be no specific 
performance. 
B. THE COURT CANNOT GRANT SPE-
CIFIC PERFORMANCE OF AN INCOM-
PLETE VERBAL AGREE~iENT. 
Even if there had been a full tender of the money 
alleged to be the agreed purchase price, there could 
have been no specific performance as contract "\vas not 
20 
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in \vriting and \Yas not sufficiently complete to be spe-
c-ifically enforceable. 
It should be noted here that much n1ore care should 
be taken in granting a decree for specific perfortnance 
for the sale of property than would be the case in a 
lease, as the sale of property alienates the land forever 
from the owners, and any mistake cannot be rectified. 
'r hile in a lease for a term of years, the mistake will 
rectify itself by the return of the property to the o\vner 
at the expiration of the lease period. 
It is noted also that such things as exact bound-
aries and some other terms would not be so pertinent, as 
a person could occupy the premises for years without 
ever having to have the exact boundaries determined ; 
but in a sale the exact boundaries would have to be 
deter1nined before the property could be transferred. 
However, assuming that the appellants had ten-
dered the alleged prices, it would still be unenforceable, 
as the option must have all of the requirements of a 
written contract which is specifically enforceable. 
Ant. Jur., Specific Performance_, P. 139 of Vol. 49, 
Sec. 117, provides: 
"The contract consummated by the exercise of 
an option is, of course, subject to all the prin-
ciples and rules with respect to specific perform-
ance that apply generally to contracts imposing 
mutual obligations. It must be certain as to 
price, manner of payment, and description of 
the property. If an option is so lacking in ma-
terial parts that an acceptance of it does not 
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make a complete contract, specific performance 
may not be decreed." 
The Statute of Frauds as set forth in the Utah Code 
Title 25, Chapter 5, Section 1, states the manner in 
which an option or any other interest in land may be 
created as f ollo,vs : 
"No estate or interest in real property, other 
than leases for a term not exceeding one year, 
nor any trust or power over or concerning real 
property or in any manner relating thereto, 
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered 
or declared otherwise than by act or operation 
of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing 
subscribed by the party creating, granting, as-
signing, surrendering or declaring the same, or 
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by 
writing.'' 
As can be seen, to comply with the Statute of Frauds) 
there must be a specific writing, having therein all the 
conditions of the contract. In this case the Defendants 
are contending that part performance of the contract 
is sufficient to take the contract out of the Statute of 
Frauds and would be enforceable. Part performance 
cannot cure the defects in a contract or supply terms 
that are not there. 
-~-It should be noted that in all the cases investigated 
and checked by counsel where there was any holding 
that part performance which \vould take it out of the 
Statute of Frauds there has been a contract ,vhere all 
the terms were agreed upon and the parties have gone 
ahead in the manner according to their oral agreement 
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or defective 'vritten agrcetnent, thinking they \vere liv-
ing up to their agreen1ent; and they were perforn1ing 
under the contract, but the difficulty \\·as in the forn1 
of the agreetnent; and so the courts have someti1nes 
held that it 'vould be unjust to permit a person to take 
advantage of the benefits of the contract as they set 
it up and not be liable under the tertns therein. 
1 n this particular instance, the parties did not go 
ahead in the 1nanner that all testified was agreed upon, 
na1nely that the agreement was to be in 'vriting and 
signed by all the parties; and so the Defendants, by 
going ahead and proceeding to make improvements or 
nutke payments knew that they were not doing so under 
the ter1ns of any written lease or claimed option, and 
that the specific terms of the agreement have never 
been settled. 
It should be noted that in all cases cited under Point 
I that said cases will apply with equal force to the argu-
ment set forth under Point II. 
For the specific enforcement of a contract to be 
granted, it is held that the contract must be definite. See 
Campbell et al. vs. Nelson et al_, previously cited, as 
well as Birdzell t·s. Utah Oil Refining Company_, pre-
viously cited, 'vhich states, in addition to matters pre-
viously set forth, that: 
"It is fundamental that the memorandum 
"~hich is relied upon to satisfy the Statute of 
Frauds must contain all the essential terms and 
provisions of the contract." 
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And held: 
"That the above lease will suffice as an ade-
quate memorandum, because it makes an ac-
knowledgment or recognition that a contract has 
been entered into by the parties." 
In the particular case at bar the appellants at-
temped to show that the description was agreed upon. 
It is fundamental that the agreement itself contain the 
boundaries or that it refer to a manner in which the 
boundaries can be determined by parole evidence or 
by some other manner. 
Here there is no reference as to how much was to 
be specified in the contract and no reference as to how 
it could be determined. Mr. Adams owned property on 
two sides of the property in question ( T. 22, L. 22). 
The surveyor testified that 1\tlrs. Adams told him where 
the stakes should be. Mrs. Adams testified that he put 
the stakes beyond where she told him to (T. 30). She 
also testified that amount of land was not discussed 
(T. 29). She assumed that the amount of land would 
be the amount that was originally rented each time with 
the building, but Taylors wanted a piece about twice 
as large ( T. 30) . 
The Defendant, Mr. Taylor, stated that the prop-
erty leased was to extend to a certain pole on the prop-
erty and the surveyor testified that he didn't stake it 
up to that pole. So it can be seen that the extent of 
the boundary is very much in doubt even from the parole 
evidence, none of which should have been admitted, as 
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it \\'as not sho\vn to have been a part of the original 
agreement. 
In fact, from all the testiinonies it cannot be de-
termined \vhen and if any agreement was ever reached. 
'fhe 1nen1orandtun signed by 1\Irs. Adams said n1erely 
"four to five years,., which, of course, might be con-
strued to be in the alternative if that 'vas the only ques-
t ion. llo\vever, in the testimony it \vas stated that it 
'vas' first agreed to twelve years, then ten years, and 
finally the four or five years, and the only agreement 
that "·as dra,vn up, as shown by the testimony, was 
the lease with option which was never signed and 'vhich 
tern1 there was stated to be ten years. Clearly in view 
of the testitnony, the term 'vas ambiguous and impos-
sible to determine from any agreement or statements 
from the parties. From all the testimonies it is further 
shown that there were a number of other details of the 
lease 'vhich were never ironed out, such as: 
The time of commencement, 
'\There it was to be paid, 
Whether cash or time on the option, 
''Tho "'"as to be responsible for the taxes, 
''Tho 'vas to furnish fire insurance, if any was to 
to be furnished, 
''Thether or not there was to be any responsibility 
on the landlord's part of maintenance, 
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Whether the lease and option were personal and 
who was to be assigned, 
'Vhether or not there was to be a grace period al-
lower, and 
Whether abstract or title insurance was to be fur-
nished, and if so at whose expense. 
From the above and foregoing it is clear that the 
appellants are not entitled to specific performance be-
cause: 
1. Defendants never exercised their option if there 
was an option and did not offer to. 
2. There was no oral agreement. 
a. Because all parties agreed that it should be 
written. 
b. Because it didn't contain all of the terms of a 
binding agreement as clearly required. 
3. Even if there was an oral agreement it is not 
sufficient as an option agreement must be in writing. 
4. The only memorandu1n concerning the agree-
ment was not signed by the owner or any agent author-
ized in writing. 
5. Even if we assume it was signed by an agent, 
memorandum is not sufficient as it is incomplete and 
doesn't contain all of the terms as required of the writ-
Ing. 
6. That any purported verbal agreement was in-
defintie, ambiguous and unenforceable. 
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POINT III 
'l'liE COUR'l' ERRED IN FAILING TO 
r\\\'1\RD RESPONDEN'fS POSSESSION 01~-, 
PRE~IISES AND FAILING TO A\\' ARD 
TREBLE DA~IAGES F 0 R THE APPEL-
LAN1'S' },AlLURE TO QUIT AND VACATE. 
As has been clearly shown from the previous points 
in respondents' brief, the tenancy as entered into by 
the 'faylors could have been nothing except a month-
to-month tenancy, and based on a month-to-month ten-
ancy the Adamses were entitled to give the Taylors 
notice to quit and vacate. 
The 1953 Utah Code Annotated as amended pro-
vides in 'l'itle 78, Chapter 36, Paragraph 3, subpara-
graph 2: 
"When, having leased real property for an 
indefinite time 'vith monthly or other periodic 
rent reserved, he continues in possession thereof 
in person or by subtenant after the end of any 
such month or period, in cases where the land-
lord or the successor in estate of his landlord 
if any there is, fifteen days or more prior to the 
end of such month or period, shall have served 
notice requiring him to quit the premises at the 
expiration of such month or period." 
If due and pr~per notice was given and the Taylors 
failed to quit and vacate the premises, then the Adamses 
would be entitled to recover the property and damages 
for failure to vacate in the time specified. 
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Here there was no question about the fact that 
notice to quit and vacate was duly given to Mrs. Taylor 
on the business premises. The appellants claim that 
Mr. Taylor did not receive service. 
The Code at the title and chapter above stated, but 
in Section 6, states: 
"NOTICE '1~0 QUIT-HOW SERVED. 
The notices required by the preceding sections 
may be served, either: 
( 1) By delivering a copy to the tenant per-
sonally; or, 
( 2) If he is absent from his place of resi-
dence, or from his usual place of business, by 
leaving a copy with some person of suitable age 
and discretion at either place and sending a copy 
thereof through the mail addressed to the tenant 
at his place of residence or place of business." 
The stipulation as to the testimony of the officers 
on the manner of service actually made is set forth in 
the statement of facts and clearly shows compliance 
with the code. 
There was no finding as to 'vhether or not such 
notice was duly and properly served, and the court 
should so find and upon finding should award damages 
to the respondents as the unbiased testimony under 
stipulation shows serivce to Mr. Taylor by giving a 
copy for him to Mrs. Taylor and mailing a copy to him 
at his home. 
The reasonable rental value of the property was 
not specifically set forth in the testimony, but it is 
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abundantly clear that the reasonable rental value of 
the property \vould be $50.00 per tnonth, so that the 
respondents should be entitled to recover $150.00 per 
n1onth for each and every month that said Taylors 'vere 
in the premises from July I, until these premises are 
surrendered by them to the Adamses. 
Said title and chapter under Section 10 of Utah 
Code provides for treble damages for failure to quit 
and vacate pursuant to proper notice. 
CONCLUSION 
By \vay of summary, the evidence is clear and con-
vincing that there was never a written or verbal lease 
entered into and never a valid option to purchase \vhich 
\Vas certain in its terms; and, therefore, the holding of 
the trial court granting specific performance of the 
lease should be reversed. The holding of the trial court 
that there was no option agreement which could be spe-
cifically enforced should be affirmed. The trial court 
should be required to enter a finding that respondents 
are entitled to possession of the property and awarding 
judgment to then1 for treble damages at the rate of 
$150.00 per month from July 1, 1961 until the premises 
are finally surrendered to respondents. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOTHAIRE B. RICH 
16 East Stratford Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
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